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Did Somebody Say Augustan
Totalitarianism? Duncan Kennedy’s
‘Reflections,’ Hannah Arendt’s 
Origins, and the Continental Divide
over Virgil’s Aeneid
Elena Giusti
1 In  1992,  the  long  and  static  continental  divide  between  the  so-called  ‘Harvard’  and
‘European’ schools, which debated the Augustanism and anti-Augustanism of Augustan
texts,  and in particular of Virgil’s Aeneid, was sealed by Duncan Kennedy’s influential
essay ‘“Augustan” and “anti-Augustan”: Reflections on terms of reference’. In this essay,
Kennedy provided a mind-blowing dialectical deconstruction of the old polarity, which
ended  up  being  more  successful  than  contemporary  Augustan  literary  critics  could
foretell: notwithstanding the predictions of scholars such as Alessandro Barchiesi,1 the
debate demonstrated that it had less of a future than even Kennedy allowed. In the field
of Virgilian studies, ‘Reflections on Terms of Reference’ soon became – and indeed it still
is – the article that all Virgilians would reference, rather than engage with, in order to
demonstrate the fruitlessness of the old diatribe and to unleash Virgilian studies free to
investigate new shores.  ‘Anti-Augustan,’  as  a term, was implicitly and subconsciously
banned; with a few exceptions, the whole debate became unfashionable, the questions it
had raised were deemed unproductive and sterile.2
2 The present article aims to offer further reflections on Kennedy 1992’s ‘Reflections’ and
their reception,  in order to demonstrate that while most scholarship interpreted the
essay in relation to reader reception criticism, Kennedy 1992 is in fact in direct dialogue
with ideology critique and with academic and non-academic writings on the ideological
language of 20th century totalitarianism, a recognition which opens the door for different
applications of the piece to the field of Augustan literature and ideology, and thus for
Did Somebody Say Augustan Totalitarianism? Duncan Kennedy’s ‘Reflections,’ Ha...
Dictynna, 13 | 2016
1
different interpretations of Virgil’s text. In what follows, we shall first recapitulate the
arguments  proposed  by  Kennedy  1992  and  analyse  some  instances  of  its  scholarly
reception, before comparing its findings to what is arguably the most influential work on
totalitarianism in the 20th century, Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951). A
joint reading of the two, I shall argue, opens up new possibilities for the interpretation of
Augustan  literature,  challenging  our  understanding  of  Augustan  ideology  in  Virgil’s
Aeneid, a text which is arguably creator, no less than creation, of the ideology itself. 
 
1. Kennedy’s dialectic twist: could this really be the
end?
3 While scholars still  debated whether Virgil’s  ‘further voices’3 implied the poet’s  anti-
Augustan subversion of, and resistance to, the same Augustan ideology that the Aeneid
nonetheless participated in shaping, Duncan Kennedy’s major insight took root at the
level  of  language and dialectic.  The use of  the terms ‘Augustan’  and ‘anti-Augustan,’
Kennedy posited, betrays a distinction that only makes sense for those who believe in a
static view of language, which ‘attempts to set up categories as distinct and autonomous’4
and ‘seek[s] an ultimate validity for [its] answers in intentionalism,’5 producing a ‘type of
explanation  which  is  author-centred,  individualist,  and  which  suppresses  the  social
dimension of the discourse’.6 To such a view, Kennedy opposed:
the dynamic, discursive view… [which] sees words as the momentary intersection of
a host of discourses (open-ended, conflicting, and even contradictory), stressing the
difference within words,  their discontinuities,  and their capacity to change their
meanings.
(Kennedy 1992: 40)
4 As a consequence, 
…what as abstracts are logically opposite by the process of definition which sets
them off against each other can co-exist within discourse without contradiction, as
“war”  (its  meaning  ideologically  determined)  and  “peace”  (its  meaning  also
ideologically  determined)  do  in  the  ideology  which  generated  the  power  and
position of Augustus.
(Kennedy 1992: 40) 
5 According  to  the  dialectic  inscribed  in  this  view,  every  word  of  the  ‘establishment
discourse’  has  inscribed  within  it  ‘the  potentiality for  subversion,’7 and  therefore
becomes liable to coexist with its opposite, so much so that the term ‘Augustan’ always
already implies and even necessitates its own subversion, or inversion: just as the Greek
anti means both ‘opposite’ and ‘instead, in the place of’ (often denoting equivalence, such
as ‘as much as,’ ‘as good as’), the term ‘anti-Augustan’ changes its meaning from ‘against
Augustan’  to  ‘in  the  place  of Augustan,’  or  even  ‘ equal  to  Augustan.’8 It  turns  from
antagonist into accomplice, with anti- being left out as a mis-representative prefix, which
only reinforces the all-encompassing nature of the ideological abstract: (anti-)Augustan-
ism. 
6 Kennedy’s contribution still makes it difficult for Virgilians to approach the old debate in
a profitable way.  On the one hand,  it  has become generally agreed that  the ‘further
voices’ of Virgil or Ovid must be unhooked from a binary opposition and re-inscribed
within an ideological discourse in which many voices can coexist in their open-endedness
and apparent contradictions; on the other hand, the essay, much against its own aims,
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seems to have inadvertently contributed to a more or less tacit suppression of the term
‘anti-Augustan’  altogether  rather  than  stimulating  further  reflections  on  its  shifting
meaning. In Virgilian studies, Kennedy 1992 is most often referenced, when referenced,
as an excuse for disregarding the debate, with little or no attempt at actual engagement.
A few exceptions, such as Martindale’s 1993 essay ‘Descent into Hell. Reading Ambiguity,
or Virgil and the Critics’ and Thomas’s 2001 monograph Virgil and the Augustan Reception,
use Kennedy 1992 in order to shift the focus from Virgil to Augustus and Augustanism, or
rather to the idea of ‘Augustus’  and ‘Augustanism,’  and to the infinite ways that the
shifting discourse of Augustan ideology can be (re-)appropriated in readers’ reception.9
This  reception  of  Kennedy  1992  in  terms  of  reader-response  criticism  has  been  so
influential that the piece is sometimes referenced together with Alison Sharrock’s 1994
article ‘Ovid and the politics of reading,’10 even though Sharrock 1994 can actually be
recognised as the first attempt to respond to Kennedy precisely by using reader-response
criticism as a means to validate the anti-Augustanism of Ovid’s Ars Amatoria. ‘A text of
itself,’ writes Sharrock in a quotation often referenced together with Kennedy, ‘cannot be
either “pro-” or “anti-” “Augustan,” only readings can be’.11 But this should not lead us
necessarily into an aporetic strategy, since, she writes, ‘if everyone who responded to it
[i.e. the Ars] read it as subversive… then it seems to me to stretch the credible bounds of
the authority of intention to claim that the text is not anti-Augustan’.12 Her conclusion,
however, concedes to Kennedy that even if we allow this anti-Augustan reading, the act of
undermining Augustan authority necessarily accords that authority and so legitimises it.
13 
7 Sharrock 1994 is one of the very few contributions that recognise these two partially
distinct strands of Kennedy 1992: reader-response criticism and ideology critique. But
Sharrock also opens the door for the Ovidians’ reactions to Kennedy, which strikingly
counterpoise the silence of the Virgilians. This is due in part to the fact that Kennedy
1992, although it clearly means to respond to the Virgilian debate, chose instead Horace’s
Satires and Ovid’s Ars and Fasti as examples for the old polarity’s dissolution. But it is also
true  that  some  of  the  anti-Augustan  readings  of  Ovid  only  succeed  if  they  are
simultaneously accompanied by Augustan readings of Virgil – notably by Ovid himself.
This is the case with Sharrock’s interpretation of Ovid’s mockery of the Georgics in the Ars,
14 or of Barchiesi’s reading of Numa in the Fasti as set in opposition to Aeneid 6, and thus,
incidentally, to the Prince himself.15 Perhaps paradoxically, the Ovidian anti-Augustan
reactions to Kennedy can be seen to do a disservice rather than a service to the so-called
Harvard School of Virgilian studies.
8 If we home in on these Ovidian reactions, we see, on the anti-Augustan side, Sergio Casali,
Anthony Boyle and especially Peter Davis;16 on the Augustan – or rather Kennedian – side,
Alessandro  Barchiesi,  Ellen  O’Gorman,  Thomas  Habinek  and  Philip  Hardie.  This
‘Kennedian’ side is pretty varied: on the one hand, in 1997, Ellen O’Gorman, much like
Alison  Sharrock,  ‘take[s]  the  point  that  the  term  “oppositional”  itself  sustains  the
domination  which  it  purports  to  examine,’17 and  Philip  Hardie’s  formulation  of  an
‘ineluctable collusion between artist and ruler’18 would become quite influential among
Augustan scholars; on the other hand, Barchiesi’s The Poet and The Prince shows concern
over aporetic outcomes, and scepticism throughout toward the possibility of expressing
arguments  without  preconceived judgments,19 a  risk  that  Thomas  Habinek avoids  by
confessing from the start his anti-Galinskian preference for the ‘bleaker aspects’ of the
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Augustan age when using Kennedy 1992 to show that ‘an important task of the critic is to
bring out the contradictory aspects of power that a given text seeks to suppress’.20
9 Among the anti-Augustan Ovidians, one must single out the work of Peter Davis, whose
anti-Kennedian obsession with Kennedy 1992 could eventually be seen to help legitimise,
rather than undermine, the authority of Kennedy’s essay. Davis devotes the whole first
chapter of Ovid and Augustus, a reworking of his 1999 article, to a refutation of Kennedy. It
seems  to  me,  however,  that  Davis  and  Kennedy  speak  two  different  languages,21
attributing different ‘meanings’ to ‘meaning,’ when Davis presents Kennedy’s argument
with the lapidary statement that ‘for Kennedy, it seems, the terms “pro-Augustan” and
“anti-Augustan” are essentially meaningless’.22 Davis argues that,  even if  we allow an
anti-Augustan reading of the most Augustan text of all, the Res Gestae, this does not mean
that the Augustan and anti-Augustan interests are not ‘identifiable and distinct’: ‘does
anyone  really  believe,’  he  asks,  ‘that  the  Res  Gestae can  usefully  be  labelled  “anti-
Augustan”?’.23 As much as he refrains from it, Davis’s focus on ‘interests’ here clearly calls
for  authorial  agency  and  intentionality,  and  does  not  discuss  the  ideological
establishment discourse, and the fact that it is shaped in such a way as to incorporate and
therefore  prevent  the  opposite  interests.  It  seems  to  me  that  the  cause  of  this
misunderstanding must be sought in the reception of Kennedy 1992 as a piece of reader-
reception criticism rather than ideology critique. This is clear from Davis’ labelling of
Kennedy’s view ‘not as up-to-date “reception criticism” but as old-fashioned subjectivism’
24 when reacting to Kennedy’s dissolution of the polarity within a dynamic framework,
which is perhaps the most famous passage of the essay: 
no statement (not even made by Augustus himself) can be categorically “Augustan”
or “anti-Augustan”; the traces of its constituent discourses were – and still are –
open to appropriation in the opposite interest. The degree to which a voice is heard
as conflicting or supportive is a function of the audience’s – or critic’s – ideology, a
function, therefore, of reception. Power is successful in so far as it manages not so
much to silence or suppress as to determine the consumption of the oppositional voice
within its discourse.
(Kennedy 1992: 40)
10 Davis reads this passage as inherently contradictory: how can Kennedy claim that it is the
reader’s ideology that determines the reaction to the text and at the same time say that it is
for the text to determine that very same reaction?25 
 
2. Kennedy’s ‘Reflections’ and Augustan
Totalitarianism
11 The question that Davis  justly poses may be answered,  I  submit,  by recognising that
Kennedy 1992 displays, consciously or subconsciously, a clear influence from works of
fiction and perhaps academic writings on the ideological language of totalitarianism. If
we analyse the essay under this lens, it is possible to flip it over and make it sustain a
totalising, if not totalitarian, view of Augustanism – which would turn the essay itself into
an arguably ‘anti-Augustan’ piece. Since the power of totalitarian ideologies lies in their
ability to incorporate the voice of dissent within the voice of consent, the practice of
unmasking their inner workings to lay bare their artificial structure is the only weapon
left with which to oppose them: if we read Kennedy 1992 in this way, it can actually be
used to sustain anti-Augustan readings in a way which is peculiarly different from the
Harvard School, but can still count as oppositional.
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12 Let us turn to Kennedy’s reflection on the co-existence of the opposites ‘war’ and ‘peace’
in Augustan ideology.26 In this passage, Kennedy is explicitly indebted to a 1985 essay by
Erich Gruen, ‘Augustus and the Ideology of War and Peace,’ in which Gruen argues how
Augustus ‘did not so much celebrate peace as the means of its accomplishment,’ as in the
Res Gestae’s parta uictoriis pax (RG 14), in which Augustus ‘pronounced no pacifist creed but
declared a warrior’s achievement.’27 In the same piece, Gruen also interprets the outside
panels of the Ara Pacis in a double set of oppositions: Aeneas performing a sacrifice to the
Penates is balanced by a partially preserved Mars, while the unidentified female deity
‘calling  attention  to  the  blessings  of  a  tranquil  time’  has  her  opposite  in  the  very
fragmentary panel of Roma seating on a pile of arms. ‘The imagery,’ Gruen argues, ‘takes
on meaning in combination. The accomplishment of peace is inseparable from success in
war.’28 
13 This reading of Augustan ideology as a combination of revolution and evolution, with the
Republican, anti-Augustan side, already inscribed within both the Res Gestae and the Ara
Pacis, was in the air when Kennedy wrote. Only one year before Kennedy, and with no
reference to Gruen, Jás Elsner provided a similar interpretation of the internal frieze of
the Ara Pacis:
The fruitful bliss of the Italia scene, cow and all, is insured by the procession of
cows to their death at this very altar, by the cows becoming the skulls from which
the garlands hang. The visual pun works in both Latin and English: the garlands
depend on  the  skulls.  The  cow,  a  recurring  image  in  its  different  forms  in  the
precinct, is a visual metaphor for the reciprocity of sacrifice, for what depends on
what and for the cost of Augustan plenty. The scene of Italia could not be there but
for this altar, could have no meaning but for the skulls.
(Elsner 1991: 58)
14 After comparing this imagery to the blood imagery and slaughter present in Horace’s
Carmen Saeculare (lines 49-52), Elsner comes to the conclusion that: 
the image of blood – which echoes in the references to war and sacrificial slaughter
– is transferred to the Princeps upon whom the success of these acts depends. To be
Augustus is an act of blood (in both the kin and carnage senses of the word) and
upon the Augustan blood of divine progeniture, war, and sacrifice rests the golden
age of Augustan plenty…
(Elsner 1991: 59)
15 Therefore, reading the anti-Augustus chez Augustus is not peculiar to Kennedy, but it is
only Kennedy who glosses Gruen’s chapter with the memory of the lapidary statement
‘War is Peace’. Which happens to be the first slogan of the party that Winston Smith sees
inscribed on the white pyramidal building of the Ministry of Truth at the beginning of
Orwell’s  Nineteen  Eighty-Four,  a  work  that  would  later  prove  especially  influential  in
Kennedy’s own work:29
The Ministry of Truth – Minitrue, in Newspeak… was startlingly different from any
other object in sight. It was an enormous pyramidal structure of glittering white
concrete,  soaring up, terrace after terrace,  300 metres into the air.  From where
Winston stood it was just possible to read, picked out on its white face in elegant
lettering, the three slogans of the Party:
WAR IS PEACE
FREEDOM IS SLAVERY
IGNORANCE IS STRENGTH
(George Orwell 1949, Nineteen Eighty-Four, Chapter 1)
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16 While Gruen’s chapter focussed on pacification over peace, and on the importance of
foreign war for that pacification, Kennedy 1992 takes it to mean that in the Augustan
ideology even civil war, the main concern of Virgil’s anti-Augustanism, can equal peace,
that  discordia can  spell  concordia.  This  perversion  of  language  resonates  with  the
totalitarian perversion of language as described by Orwell  in the party’s intention to
make dissent simply unpronounceable in Newspeak. When we read Kennedy 1992 in the
light not just of Orwell, but also of John Henderson’s use of Romespeak to describe the
language of the establishment discourse at Rome,30 we can see the loaded anti-Augustan
connotations  of  the  terms  chosen  by  Kennedy  in  a  sentence  such  as  ‘the  power  of
Augustus was a collective invention… a complex network of dependency, repression, and fear
’.31 When Kennedy claims that, in Horace’s Satires, ‘the word libertas… a term previously
mobilised  to  support  a  non-monarchical  system…  changed  direction  to  support  an
autocratic one,’32 or that ‘Ovid’s ironic and flippant appropriation [i.e. of the Augustan
programme]… helps to render [it] legitimate,’33 he is also drawing attention to the poets’
inability  to  express  an  oppositional  statement  except  within  a  discourse  that  has
rendered that opposition impossible to voice. 
17 In short, Kennedy 1992 itself seems to attempt to mirror the ideology that it describes,
inasmuch as it is used to sustain both (pro-) Augustan and anti-Augustan scholarship. The
essay is in fact praised by Karl  Galinsky as a piece to which his 1996 (pro-)Augustan
monograph (Augustan Culture: An Interpretative Introduction) is much indebted,34 and Peter
Davis does not hesitate to tar Galinsky and Kennedy with almost exactly the same brush.35
However, Kennedy 1992 is at the same time used by Thomas Habinek in an explicitly anti-
Galinskian vein,36 and one may well suspect that its indebtedness to Orwell is laid bare in
John Henderson’s review article of Galinsky’s monograph, which emphasises the scholars’
discovery of ‘double-think involved in post-Actian discourse’37 as a means to overcome
the stale bipolar options of the old continental debate.
 
3. Arendt’s Origins and Augustan Totalitarianism
18 It is with this anti-ideological, and therefore anti-Augustan, reading of Kennedy 1992 in
mind that I shall now turn to Hannah Arendt’s writings on totalitarianism, not with the
aim of establishing a direct relationship between Arendt’s work and Kennedy’s essay, but
in order to assess how a joint analysis of the two can illuminate our understanding of
Augustan ideology in general, as well as providing further reflections on the stale debate
over Virgil’s Aeneid in particular. There is,  however, a double danger inherent in this
practice. Firstly, since even the use of the term propaganda has often been argued to be
anachronistic  for  the  Augustan  context,38 any  association  between  the  concept  of
totalitarianism and the Augustan regime may sound like a deliberate and unjustified
anachronism, which it  certainly is.  Clearly the Augustan regime had nothing like the
means of control and propaganda that we associate with the totalitarianisms of the 20th
century, and nor does it sound reasonable, let alone appealing, to coerce the complexities
of Augustan poetry into the picture of a mere laboratory for the spreading of political
messages.39 Moreover, it must be noted that even in contemporary practice the concept of
totalitarianism is not conceived of as applicable outside its very limited field of action.
Indeed,  the  scholarship  on  totalitarianism  moves  no  less  carefully  than  classical
scholarship when using the term outside Hannah Arendt’s limitation of the concept as
inextricably tied to the unique experiences of 20th century Nazi Germany and the Soviet
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regime. In Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? (2011), Slavoj Žižek notes how the notion, as
conceived by Arendt, ‘far from being an effective theoretical concept, is a kind of stopgap:
instead of enabling us to think, forcing us to acquire a new insight into the historical
reality it describes, it relieves us of the duty to think, or even actively prevents us from
thinking’.40 Here, Žižek’s use of the concept as key for interpreting aspects of neo-liberal
society is intentionally provocative, but it sheds light on the fact that some modalities of
totalitarian language and propaganda actually survived the 20th century, and that studies
on their workings can still enlighten very different political systems from the ones that
they originally purported to explain.41 
19 To apply the notion of totalitarianism forwards, as Žižek does, undermines the concept of
totalitarianism as set out by Arendt; but to apply it backwards, as I shall do below, goes
even more explicitly against Arendt, who emphasises more than once in The Origins the
difference between dictatorships, tyrannies, authoritarian rules and the totalitarianism of
Hitler  and Stalin,  in which not  even Mussolini’s  government completely partakes,  as
much as Italian fascism provided the origin of the term in the first place.42 Indeed, in The 
Origins, Arendt argues from the start for the unprecedented and unparalleled experience
of totalitarianism. In the section on antisemitism as the first root of totalitarian rule, she
points out how ‘the rise of terror as a major weapon of government’ works differently
from other dictatorships and tyrannies, in so far as it is now used ‘as an instrument to
rule masses of people who are perfectly obedient,’  striking victims who are ‘innocent
even from the point of view of the persecutor’.43 In the section on imperialism as the
second root of totalitarian rule, she singles out ‘expansion for expansion’s sake’ as an
‘entirely new concept in the long history of political thought and action’.44 Finally, the
section  on  totalitarianism  emphasises  the  differences  between  the  new  principle  of
totalitarian domination and the old principle of authority: while ‘authority is meant to
restrict or limit freedom… totalitarian domination… aims at abolishing freedom, even at
eliminating human spontaneity in general’.45
20 The  differences  between  authoritarian,  tyrannical  and  totalitarian  governments  are
addressed not only in the section of The Origins devoted to totalitarianism, but even more
thoroughly in the 1954 essay ‘What is Authority?’.46 Here Arendt distinguishes the three
systems by using three different representative models. While Orwell’s Ministry of Truth
had  a  pyramidal  structure,  the  pyramid  for  Arendt  is  limited  to  authoritarian  and
tyrannical rules. This is because the source of authority lies outside the authoritarian
government, and the seat of its power is located at the top.47 The Romans, as she later
expounds  in  the  essay,  invented  both  authority  and  tradition,48 but  their  source  of
authority, in contrast to the Christian system, lay exclusively in the past, and thus the
Roman model can be represented with a downward pyramid, which stretches into the
depth of an earthly past rather than into the heights of the sky.49 The pyramid is also the
model for tyrannical rule, but in this case one must imagine a pyramid in which all the
intervening layers between top and bottom have been destroyed, so that the bottom is
levelled,  and  the  ruler  remains  suspended  at  the  top,  above  anyone  else.50 In
contradistinction to these regimes, totalitarianism for Arendt is better represented by an
onion, because the totalitarian leader does not act from the top of the structure, but from
within the structure, and hierarchy is abolished in favour of a direct relationship between
all  strata  of  the  structure  and  the  leader,  whose  will  can  be  embodied  by  anyone,
‘everywhere and at all times’:
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In contradistinction to both tyrannical and authoritarian regimes, the proper image
of totalitarian rule and organization seems to me to be the structure of the onion,
in whose center, in a kind of empty space, the leader is located; whatever he does –
whether  he  integrates  the  body  politic  as  in  an  authoritarian  hierarchy,  or
oppresses his subjects like a tyrant – he does it from within, and not from without
or above… The great advantage of this system is that the movement provides for
each of its layers, even under conditions of totalitarian rule, the fiction of a normal
world along with a consciousness of being different from and more radical than it…
(Arendt 1961 [or. 1954]: 99)
…between the supreme power (the Fuehrer) and the ruled there are no reliable
intervening levels,  each of  which should receive  its  due share  of  authority  and
obedience. The will of the Fuehrer can be embodied everywhere and at all times,
and  he  himself  is  not  tied  to  any  hierarchy,  not  even  the  one  he  might  have
established himself.
(Arendt 2004 [or. 1951]: 525)
21 Arendt’s belief in the uniqueness of the 20th century experience should not prevent us
from applying her insights into the workings of totalitarian systems to different contexts
as well.  As much as she stresses the pyramidal structure of Roman authoritarianism,
Arendt herself does not provide any clue as to how to reconcile this downward pyramid,
in which authority is based and placed in the exemplary past, with a regime such as that
of Augustus, who at the same time helped in shaping, choosing, and therefore re-creating
and rewriting that past by inserting himself into every bit of it as its ultimate telos,51 and
also presented his governmental system – both a continuation and a rupture from the
Republic – through another of those contradictory coexistences of opposites encapsulated
in the concept of primus inter pares. Even though Arendt herself would have objected to
the suggestion, this concept seems to echo her symbolic rendering of totalitarian rule as
the paradoxical system in which the leader’s all-encompassing power depends on the fact
that he is located both above and at anyone else’s level. What is more, Arendt’s insights
remind  us  closely  of  Kennedy’s  interpretation  of  the  all-encompassing  nature  of
Augustanism, since Arendt argues that it is the performed and advertised equality of the
leader that allows him to transcend those who nonetheless remain his ‘subjects’ and to
transform himself into a concept, an ideology, which can be embodied and applied by
anyone without the need for  intermediaries.  While tyrants  are aloft  and above their
subjects,  with whom they communicate through a repressive system of  intermediate
layers, the totalitarian leader instead represents himself as one – but the one – of his
subjects. This is how he manages to permeate all strata of the population in an ultimately
repressive way, but by temporarily maintaining the ‘fiction of a normal world’ in which
oppositional voices are never explicitly silenced, but only recomposed in order to make
them adhere to the new system. This is the totalising nature of Augustanism as expressed
by Kennedy: the ultimate reason why it is impossible to track down dissent in terms of
anti-Augustanism. Indeed, we have already seen how Kennedy’s notion that the regime is
successful ‘in so far as it manages not so much to silence or suppress as to determine the
consumption of  the  oppositional  voice  within  its  discourse’ 52 resonates  with  the
totalitarian perversion of language as described by Orwell  in the party’s intention to
make dissent simply unpronounceable in Newspeak. This does not mean that one should
stop wondering about the presence of such dissent in the Augustan texts, but rather that
we must always be conscious of the fact that the Augustan revolution often makes the
languages of dissent and consent appear indistinguishable. 
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22 By adopting this perspective, we move our focus from the author, as well as from the
reader, to the context, although the latter in turn is also partly a construction made both
by the author and by ourselves as readers. To take as an example the never-ending debate
over the interpretation of Virgilian ambiguity,53 we do not wonder whether ambiguities
in Virgil may be a deliberate sign of his disallegiance to the regime, nor do we argue that
their meaning is ultimately dependent on our unavoidably prejudiced reception of them.
Rather, we take both their existence and the open-endedness of their interpretation as a
sign not of the ‘doublespeak’ of the author, but of the ‘doublethink’ of the system, i.e. of
the ‘power [of the Augustan literary language] of holding two mutually contradictory
beliefs… simultaneously, and accepting both of them’.54 This kind of doublethink implies
no danger of subverting the current political order, because there exists no conceivable
realistic option to that order, and therefore no correspondent language for conveying a
desire  for  such unimaginable  alternative.  In  the  Aeneid,  for  instance,  the  continuous
evocation of civil war can be thought to convey Virgil’s ‘further voice’ of dissent and
unmask  the  horrors  on  which  the  Augustan  regime is  founded,55 but  it  can  also  be
reinscribed within the language of Augustan ideology and signify the very necessity and
prerequisite for the founding of the Principate, which needed to ‘destroy’ the degenerate
late Republic in order to start  ‘contructing’  anew.56 Scholars interested in recovering
Virgil’s intention can therefore either argue that Virgil’s reminder of the price to pay for
the pax Augusta attempts to dismantle the optimistic vision that the ideology of the pax 
itself wanted to promote, or instead posit that Virgil’s civil war echoes are deliberately
juxtaposed  with  the optimistic  vision  of  the  present  and  future  regime  in  order  to
magnify the achievement of pax. While the preference for one interpretation over the
other is ultimately driven by our preconceived beliefs and interests, it is difficult, once we
look at the context, to conceive how a poet born in 70 BCE in a political system which had
been in crisis since at least 133 BCE could still conceive of republicanism as a realistic
rather than idealistic political option. All the more so since the Augustan regime had
anticipated the possible adoption,  at  the hands of  its  opponents,  of  the political  and
religious context  that  predated the crisis,  by presenting itself  as  a  restitution of  the
(middle) Republic and leaving its opponents as supporters of the morally corrupt late
Republic of the civil wars. The Principate therefore was not the best option, but the only
option, the Republican option: what could an anti-Augustan Republican support if not
Augustus himself? 
 
4. Augustus’ Ministry of Truth 
23 I have so far shown how a reading of Kennedy 1992 in the light of totalitarianism takes us
to the suggestion that Augustan ideology allowed the ‘fiction of a normal world’ in which
anti-Augustan  and  pro-Augustan  thinking  could  coexist  without  discord  in  the
‘doublethink’ expressed by the literary texts, at least as long as these did not attempt to
propose alternative leaders or realistic political alternatives.57 However, there is a further
aspect of Arendt’s totalitarianism which may be recognised as equally applicable to the
interpretation of Augustan literary texts, with regard to their tendency to recompose,
and therefore ‘rewrite,’  past Republican history with a teleological  drive towards the
Augustan regime.  Once Republican history is  reconfigured in the light of  this  higher
Augustan telos, its particular events can also be explained and interpreted according to
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the wider ideological system, which bears no little resemblance to the ideological system
of totalitarian regimes as analysed by Arendt in The Origins. 
24 Arendt’s insistence on the uniqueness of totalitarian rule must be inscribed within her
belief that the practice of the historians cannot in any way enable us to make future
predictions.58 Such a conviction is made even more cogent when we read it in direct
opposition to what she identifies as itself a practice of totalitarian propaganda and of
ideologies in general. For Arendt, totalitarian propaganda is based on ‘the assertion that
all happenings are scientifically predictable,’59 and in doing so it develops the totalitarian
nature of all ideologies, which ‘pretend to be scientific philosophies’60 whose ‘claim to
total explanation promises to explain all historical happenings: the total explanation of
the past, the total knowledge of the present, and the reliable prediction of the future.’61
The role of what she calls the ‘rewriters of history’ in totalitarian systems – employees of
Orwell’s ‘Ministry of Truth’ – involves a rewriting of the past as well as a prediction of the
future. Their aim is ‘to reveal official history as joke, to demonstrate a sphere of secret
influences  of  which  the  visible,  traceable,  and  known  historical  reality  is  only  the
outward façade erected explicitly to fool the people’.62 This attitude was only possible
among an intellectual elite which had become, through the traumatic experience of the
first war, already averse to official historiography and believed that history ‘was a forgery
anyway’. This cynical loss of belief entailed tremendous consequences: 
To this aversion of the intellectual elite for official historiography, to its conviction
that  history,  which  was  a  forgery  anyway,  might  as  well  be  the  playground of
crackpots, must be added the terrible, demoralizing fascination in the possibility
that  gigantic  lies  and  monstrous  falsehoods  can  eventually  be  established  as
unquestioned facts, that man may be free to change his own past at will, and that
the difference between truth and falsehood may cease to be objective and become a
mere matter of power and cleverness, of pressure and infinite repetition.
(Arendt 2004 [or. 1951]: 441) 
25 According to Arendt, this blind and unscientific belief into the existence of a consistent
and wholly explicable system of connections which can explain past, present and future
events is the most dangerous method for interpreting and ultimately exploiting history.
When scientific historiography dies, the gaps in our historical knowledge end up being
filled not by educated and cautious conjectures played off against one another, but by
one-sided and unjustified chains of equally unjustified plots. As we shall see more clearly
below, these plots are conjectured both by ‘the destroyers of history,’ and by the subjects
themselves, already endowed with the authority to embody their leader, the ideology,
and therefore also allowed to fill in the gaps of history by using the same holistic system
of connections indirectly suggested by the ideology itself. This gives rise to a maze of
conspiracy theories (such as that of the existence of a Jewish world-conspiracy) whose
truth is impossible to disqualify from within the system, if  not without breaking the
whole system of consistency on which the theories themselves have been built up.
26 This  practice  of  rewriting  history  is  also  considered  by  Arendt  a  unique  modern
experience: the ancients, she writes, were merely ‘satisfied with a passing victory of the
argument at the expense of truth, whereas the moderns want a more lasting victory at
the expense of  reality’;  while ‘the old manipulators of logic were the concern of  the
philosopher… the modern manipulators  of  facts  stand in the way of  the historian.’63
Nevertheless, I  shall go one more time explicitly against Arendt and suggest that her
reflections on the workings of ideologies have significant bearings for our interpretation
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of Augustan poetry, and especially for our understanding of the ‘continental divide’ over
the interpretation of Virgil’s Aeneid.
27 Let us turn briefly to the use of Republican history in Book 4 of the Aeneid. The episode of
Aeneas and Dido, as is well known, includes significant echoes of both mid-Republican
and late Republican history. On the one hand, it is an aition for the outbreak of the Punic
wars, explicitly predicted by Dido in her curse (Aen. 4.621-9),64 while the destruction of
Carthage is evoked and mapped onto Dido’s very death by means of an eloquent simile (
Aen. 4.669-71),65 and further evocations of the Punic conflict are present at various points
in Books 1 and 4.66 On the other hand, however, critics have long recognised allusions to
the civil/foreign war that ended the Roman Republic in the doubling of the characters of
Antony and Cleopatra in the mythical love story between Aeneas and Dido:67 both Antony
and Aeneas are Roman, or proto-Roman, lovers delayed in the alluring and luxurious
court of an oriental queen; both queens commit suicide and are tied to each other by an
unmistakable linguistic echo (cf. Dido at Aen. 4.644 pallida morte futura and Cleopatra at
Aen. 8.709 pallentem morte futura). 
28 Readers of ‘further voices’ in the Aeneid, emphasising the sympathetic portrait of Dido,
may  interpret  the  comparison  between  Dido’s  death  and  Carthage’s  destruction  as
expressing Virgil’s  anti-imperialistic  stance,  while optimistic readers could emphasise
that  Dido’s  death  is  the  prize  to  pay  for  the  foundation of  Rome –  a  city  that  will
eventually  triumph  over  its  most  formidable  enemy.  Similarly,  the  momentary
juxtaposition with Antony can be seen to undermine the moral stance of proto-Augustan
Aeneas, or even to suggest interchangeability between Antony and Octavian, since either
winner would eventually become (a) Caesar. But at the same time the development of the
plot also suggests the opposite: namely that Aeneas/Augustus is no Antony, because if
Aeneas had behaved like Antony, Rome would have never been founded. 
29 As we have already noted in the previous section, the simultaneous availability of these
options highlights both the polysemy of Virgil’s text and the ‘doublethink’ of the literary
and ideological system of which the Aeneid is simultaneously creation and creator. But the
text also encourages us readers to fill in the dots and set up connections between the
historical events evoked therein. One possible way to reconcile the presence of Punic and
civil  wars  in  the  Carthage  episode  is  to  take  both  events  as  unavoidable  steps  of
Republican  history:  they  are  the  tanta  moles necessary  for  the  establishment  of  the
‘Augustan people’.68 To this interpretation, we may add that the two events were already
associated in literary and historiographical  texts other than the Aeneid,  and that  the
Romans perceived, at least since Sallust’s so-called ‘theorem of metus hostilis,’ a very much
alive cause-and-effect connection between the destruction of Carthage in 146 BC and the
start of the civil wars.69 As Sallust puts it in all his extant works,70 it was precisely the
destruction of Carthage, and the subsequent disappearance of that ‘fear of the enemy’
which is a necessary element of national unity, that brought about the crisis of the Roman
Republic  which ultimately  resulted in  the  shedding of  brotherly  rather  than foreign
blood. In Augustan literature, this cause-and-effect association is often evoked by Horace
(and undoubtedly attributed to Asinius Pollio in his Ode 2.1),71 and it also surfaces in the
mouth of Hannibal in Livy’s Book 30.72 Thus the Punic wars not only led to the abolition of
Rome’s arch-enemy but also triggered the civil conflict which resulted from that very
abolition. The simultaneous evocation of Punic and civil wars in Aeneid 4 may bring light
to the cause-and-effect connection between the two events, also possibly presented by
Dido in her curse when she ordains not just the Punic wars, but more specifically the wars
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in  Latium and,  according  to  some  readers,  the  civil  conflict  (Aen.  4.629  pugnent  ipsi
nepotesque, ‘let them and their descendants fight’).73 
30 The Sallustian cause-and-effect connection between Punic and civil wars has important
repercussions for our interpretation of Virgil’s alleged dissent in the Aeneid: it diverts the
attention  from  Augustus’  participation  in  the  bloodshed  of  the  civil  wars  to  their
characterisation  as  an  undoubtedly  gloomy  historical  event,  but  caused  by  the
interruption  of  that  foreign  military  policy  that  Augustus’  Principate  celebrates  and
currently attempts to restore.  More importantly,  the suggestion inscribed in Sallust’s
theorem, namely that civil war may return if the citizens do not align with Augustus’
foreign military policy on the model of the middle Republic, turns the alleged ‘further
voice’  of  dissent  into precisely the opposite:  a  subtle  and veiled threat,  that  kind of
ideological terror which is necessarily inscribed in all forms of totalitarian propaganda.
The technique employed by Virgil  would also suit  the use of  totalitarian propaganda
described by Arendt in The Origins:
The  effectiveness  of  this  kind  of  propaganda  demonstrates  one  of  the  chief
characteristics of modern masses. They do not believe in anything visible, in the
reality of their own experience; they do not trust their eyes and ears but only their
imaginations,  which  may  be  caught  by  anything  that  is  at  once  universal  and
consistent in itself.  What convinces masses are not facts, and not even invented
facts, but only the consistency of the system of which they are presumably part …
they are predisposed to all ideologies because they explain facts as mere examples
of  laws  and  eliminate  coincidences  by  inventing  an  all-embracing  omnipotence
which is  supposed to  be  at  the  root  of  every  accident.  Totalitarian propaganda
thrives on this escape from reality into fiction, from coincidence into consistency …
Before  they  seize  power  and  establish  a  world  according  to  their  doctrines,
totalitarian  movements  conjure  up  a  lying  world  of  consistency  which  is  more
adequate to the needs of the human mind than reality itself…
(Arendt 2004 [or. 1951]: 452-4)
31 In other words, totalitarian propaganda does not explicate all reconstructions fully: it
creates a consistent system which permeates the masses’ way of perceiving reality so
much that the individuals are left to draw links for themselves, and in doing so – in
becoming active part of the ideological game – they become effectively complicit with the
ideology itself.
 
Conclusion
32 Interpreting the Aeneid is a practice that forces us to create and imagine links, and this
practice is  inextricable from a simultaneous understanding,  or reconstruction,  of  the
‘world of consistency’ that the Augustan ideology attempted to conjure up. Reading the
cause-and-effect connection between Punic and civil wars in the poem means becoming
complicit  with  the  practice  of  interpreting  past  events  according  to  a  totalising
interpretation of history which aims at historical scientificity. In this sense, the readers
themselves, and not Virgil only, turn into those rewriters – and destroyers – of history
who, according to Arendt, created ‘gigantic lies and monstrous falsehoods… so that the
difference between truth and falsehood may cease to be objective and become a mere
matter of power and cleverness, of pressure and infinite repetition’.74 
33 However, there may be a way to dissent left even when acting from within the system: to
highlight the fictionality of the whole construct, and thus to unmask the construct, and
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the ideology itself, as an artificial forgery. We have already seen how Kennedy 1992, when
analysed from this point of view, can be interpreted as an anti-ideological, and therefore
anti-Augustan piece. The same, however, may be said of Virgil’s Carthage episode, once
we notice the emphasis with which this text signposts its own fictionality.  Indeed,  if
Virgil’s Aeneid hints at the creation of ‘gigantic lies’ and ‘monstrous falsehoods,’ it does so
by drawing attention to the rewriting of both myth and history in the space dedicated to
truly monstrous Fama (Aen. 4.173-97), in which his and her singing of facta atque infecta (
Aen. 4.190) signposts the fictionality of the meeting between Aeneas and Dido, and of the
history of Antony and Cleopatra mapped beneath the mythical fiction.75 The metapoetic
attention given to the metahistorical artificiality of both stories undermines the rumours
spread against Antony, and also highlights the fact that the meeting between Aeneas and
Dido is based on a chronological impossibility, since 370 years actually passed between
the fall of Troy in 1184 BCE and Dido’s foundation of Carthage in 814 BCE. 
34 But if Virgil’s traumatic experience in the civil wars had caused a nihilistic loss of faith in
the reliability of history, as it did with the 20th century intellectuals mentioned by Arendt,
then the consciousness that the whole construct is actually based on a lie will eventually
lose its importance. Like totalitarian systems, Augustan ideology will also ‘demonstrate
that action can be based on any hypothesis and that, in the course of consistently guided
action, the particular hypothesis will become true, will become actual, factual reality’.76 
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NOTES
1. Barchiesi 1997: 6 n.1: ‘I am convinced that the field has more of a future than Kennedy himself
allows us to foresee, precisely thanks to generous contributions like the one he offers’ (cited from
the translated edition; originally 1994).
2. Impatience and dissatisfaction at the debate were already in the air on the European side as
Kennedy wrote; Hardie 1993: 2 speaks of it as ‘monotonous’ and ‘reductive’. 
3. From Parry’s  ‘two voices’  of  the  Aeneid (Parry  1963),  the  formulation ‘further  voices’  was
introduced by Lyne 1987, and soon challenged by Conte’s ‘too many voices’ (Conte 1990).
4. Kennedy 1992: 40.
5. Kennedy 1992: 42.
6. Kennedy 1992: 46.
7. Kennedy 1992: 40: ‘The dominated voice may not be heard, but is not absent; the potentiality
for subversion is inscribed in every use of every word. Thus it is that discourse, as well as being
an instrument and effect  of  power,  is  at  the same time a  focus for resistance and subversion.
Establishment discourse is shaped by and contains traces of its opposition (and vice versa), even
if the conflicting voice is not heard in its own right.’
8. A point made by Ziogas 2015: 130.
9. Martindale 1993: 31; Thomas 2001: 25-6.
10. Already since Gale 1997, a very influential reading of the Augustanism and anti-Augustanism
of Propertius in the light of Kennedy 1992.
11. Sharrock 1994: 98.
12. Sharrock 1994: 98.
13. Sharrock 1994: 122: ‘while I read Ovid in such a way as to undermine Augustan authority
staked on the moral legislation, I necessarily accord that authority and so in a sense legitimize it.’
14. Sharrock 1994: 106-9.
15. Barchiesi 1997: 175-6, in explicit opposition to Kennedy 1992.
16. Casali 2006; Boyle 2003: 9 n.22; Davis 1999 and 2006.
17. O’Gorman 1997: 104-5.
18. Hardie 1997: 182. 
19. Barchiesi 1997: 84, 272.
20. Habinek 2002: 61, with reference to Galinsky 1996. Cf. also Habinek 1998: 6, 167.
21. pace Huskey 2008; I agree better with Nau 2007.
22. Davis 2006: 10. 
23. Davis 2006: 14.
24. Davis 2006: 15.
25. Davis 2006: 15-16.
26. Kennedy 1992: 40, cited above.
27. Gruen 1985: 54.
28. Gruen 1985: 62.
29. Cf. the use of Nineteen Eighty-Four in Kennedy 2013, especially pp. 76-83.
30. At least since Henderson 1987.
31. Kennedy 1992: 35 (my emphasis).
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32. Kennedy 1992:  31  (on which see also  DuQuesnay 1984);  a  passage instead interpreted by
Galinsky 1996: 57 as signposting symbiosis of intents between Horace and Augustus.
33. Kennedy 1992: 45.
34. Galinsky 1996: 57 and 228.
35. Davis 2006: 130 n.4 attributes to Galinsky a ‘(superficially) similar view’ to Kennedy.
36. See n.20.
37. Henderson 1998: 111.
38. The question is intertwined to the degree of anachronistic analysis in Syme 1939; see Le Doze
2014: 19-38 with bibliography. Note that Zanker 1988 remains still today an unavoidable point of
departure for our understanding of Augustan ‘propaganda’.
39. See White 1993 for a reassessment of the issues of patronage and clientelism in Augustan
Rome, with the critique of Kennedy himself regarding White’s insistence on apolitical amicitia
and downplay of its power relations: ‘ideologically nothing washes whiter than White. I think I’ll
have my old powder back, please’ (Kennedy 1994: 229). 
40. Žižek 2011: 3.
41. See for example Recalcati 2007.
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ABSTRACTS
The allegedly old-fashioned debate over the pro- or anti- Augustanism of Augustan texts was
superseded in 1992 by Duncan Kennedy’s ‘reflections’ over these terms of reference. Since then,
the  old  dichotomy has  appeared  to  be  useless  in  a  dialectic  which  is  always  bound to  hold
Augustus as the unavoidable point of reference. And yet scholarship continues to be divided over
the interpretation of Augustus’ rule and its visible or invisible effects on the poetry produced
under his patronage. The present article revisits Kennedy’s influential essay and its reception,
arguing that it offers further reflections on the workings of Augustan ideology than it has so far
been assumed. Moreover, while the nature of Augustus’ rule is still a point of heated debate, the
present article argues that a combined reading of Kennedy 1992 and Hannah Arendt’s writings
over  the  ideological  language  of  totalitarian  systems  may  open  new  possibilities  for  our
interpretation the Augustan regime and the anti-Augustanism of the Augustan texts.
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